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On May 28, 1979, the foreign ministers of the five member
states of the Andean Pact, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and
Venezuela, signed the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the
Cartagena Agreement.' This marked the final step in the forma-
tion of the institutions necessary for the proper supervision and
enforcement of a regional integration scheme. By establishing a
court to assume the judicial powers that previously were performed
by the Commission, the legislative organ of the Pact, the members
effected a vital separation of powers needed to ensure proper im-
plementation of the norms set out in the Agreement.2 The absence
of an interpretive authority with the power to impose sanctions
has been a major obstacle to the Pact's integration efforts.
The need for a supranational court was recognized in the early
days of the Andean Pact, when the Commission, at its Sixth
Special Session in 1971, instructed the Board, the technical organ
of the Pact, to carry out studies for the development of a judicial
system. After an examination of dispute settlement procedures in
other regional systems, principally those of the Court of Justice of
the European Economic Community, as well as testimony from na-
tional and international authorities on the subject, the Board pro-
duced a Draft Treaty which it presented to the representatives of
the member states for signature in 1979, the tenth anniversary of
the creation of the Andean pact.' The signed Treaty now awaits
ratification by the member governments.'
Ten years is a long time for an international integration
organization to operate without a supranational authority to inter-
Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, done May 28, 1979,
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1203 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Andean Court
Treaty].
2 The dispute settlement responsibilities of the Commission are set out in the Agreement
on Sub-Regional Integration, at Art. 23, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910, 916
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Cartagena Agreement].
' Padilla, The Judicial Resolution of Legal Disputes in the Integration Movements of the
Hemisphere, 11 LAW. AMER. 75, 93 (1979).
' Authorities at the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, D.C., indicate that, as of May
20, 1980, all of the member countries except Venezuela have ratified the Treaty. (Telephone
interview).
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pret and enforce its instrument of creation.5 It must be realized,
however, that the countries of Latin America only recently
emerged into the industrial world. The policies which were
established by the integration agreement required reassessment
and its institutional systems required testing and modification in
order to develop a more workable arrangement. Many problems
arose in the efforts to unify these five nations with their vastly
different political, social and economic backgrounds. It probably
has been to the countries' advantage that the development of the
court has taken so long, since it has allowed them to adapt to the
purposes and methods of the Cartegena Agreement with a flex-
ibility of interpretation which might not have existed had there
been a court to enforce strictly the Agreement's terms.6
This Note examines the new Court Treaty in terms of its poten-
tial for enhancing economic integration in the Andean Pact. A
brief history of Latin American integration efforts will be followed
by an outline of the institutions of the Pact. Various problems that
the Pact has encountered will be discussed, including the Chilean
crisis. Then the Court Treaty itself will be analyzed, with em-
phasis placed on its strength and weaknesses as a vehicle for
economic integration.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICAN
INTEGRATION EFFORTS
Before World War II, the countries of Latin America did little
to change their economies from the mercantilist structures that
had been established in their colonial days.7 Negligible trade be-
tween the neighboring countries of Latin America was under-
taken because the trade routes that had been developed were
those connecting the colonies with their mother countries. Each
5 Padilla suggests that the reason for the absence of a provision in the Agreement
establishing such an authority might be the fact that economists usually play a major role
in the drafting of integration plans. They tend to concentrate on the economic and financial
aspects of the process while de-emphasizing the role of lawyers and courts. Padilla, supra
note 3, at 91.
' Other examples where the Treaty's flexibility has played a helpful role in the progress
of the Pact include the permission granted to apply discriminatory duties to protect certain
key industries under the safeguard clauses of Chapter IX of the Agreement and the
allowance of special concessions for particular development projects. Adaptability is crucial
to the survival of such an organization. Carl & Johnson, Venezuela and the Andean Com-
mon Market, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 151, 194 (1978).
See generally address of Filipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development
Bank, at Centro d'Azioni Latina, Rome, Italy (Jan. 28, 1960), at 3-5 (transcript on file at
Inter-American Development Bank Library).
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country's exports were limited to raw materials and primary pro-
ducts supplying first the industrial nations of Europe, then North
America and Japan. In turn, each country depended on the in-
dustrial giants to provide it with manufactured goods. This
system worked well while there was a high market demand for
the primary goods and an adequate supply of reasonably priced
manufactured products
With the advent of the Depression and World War II, the
fragile nature of this dependency relationship became evident. As
purchase money and goods in the international market declined,
Latin Americans found themselves with little foreign exchange
and few production facilities to provide replacements for the
necessities they could no longer buy. A search began for a way to
alleviate this dependency so that they could be protected from
adverse fluctuations in the world economy? The concept of import
substitution emerged and became the keynote of a decade.
A. Import Substitution
This early and somewhat primitive economic program focused
on achieving local production of local needs. Each country sought
to develop industries to supply its own domestic markets while
continuing to rely on the export of primary products to provide
revenue to fuel the development process. Extra income was used
to purchase those sophisticated goods which could not be produced
locally. They hoped to produce eventually at a level of efficiency
which would allow them to compete in the international
marketplace.
Because of the lack of capital in the area and the slow accumula-
tion of export revenues, the process depended heavily on the at-
traction of foreign investment. Various promotions were used to
do this, such as tax holidays, duty free imports of raw materials
and capital goods, and state underwriting of infrastructure costs."0
Foreign investors also brought technology and equipment that
helped expose the inexperienced labor force of Latin America to
the modern processes of the industrial world.
I M. GUERRERO, N. DEL ARCO & F. AMADOR, CRISIS EN LA INTERGRACION LATINO-
AMERICANA: EL CASO DEL GROUPO ANDINO (1974-1976) at 100 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DEL
ARCO]. Citations are to an unpublished English translation of the book obtained from Sehior
del Arco at Inter-American Development Bank.
Id. at 101.
o W. AXLINE, CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: THE POLITICS OF REGIONALISM 10 (1979).
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Although this period of local industrialization improved the ex-
perience and skills of the people of the area and established, to
some extent, a level of capital to form an industrial base, the
strategy soon reached its limits. The markets of each country
were too small to warrant production at the output level
necessary to keep large manufacturing industries operating. Since
the Latin American states had to erect substantial trade barriers
to protect their fledging industries, there could be no competition
among the countries, thus reducing the efficiency of each
country's production. The resulting limit on profits discouraged
further foreign investment and the development process began to
stagnate." It became obvious that a new plan was necessary if
maximum development was to be achieved.
B. Integration
The integration theory was inspired by the success of the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC).12 The post-World War II in-
tegration movement began in 1958 with the formation of the EEC,
which organized several similarly developed countries of Europe
to harmonize their economic policies and development strategies
to strengthen their bargaining position with the other nations of
the world. This process also served to insulate the participating
countries from the adverse effects of rapid changes in the world
economy. Similar efforts to unify the economies of the Latin
American countries have been tried since then, but with less suc-
cess than the European attempts. The reasons relate to the dif-
ferent levels of development reached by the countries and the
unstable nature of their political systems, upon which falls the
task of coordinating the processes of industrialization. 3
In the 1950's, the governments of Latin America decided that
regional integration, rather than the autarkic approach of import
substitution, was a more practical method for expanding their in-
dustrial production and improving the development of their
economies." This also would help reduce the dependence of Latin
Id. at 11.
2 Padilla, supra note 3, at 75.
See generally Vargas-Hidalgo, An Evaluation of the Andean Pact, 10 LAW. AMER. 401
(1978).
" In general, regional integration organizations attempt to improve economic efficiency,
increase each member's share of the benefits of their transactions with non-members, and
equitably distribute the benefits from both processes among the members. Moxon, Har-
monization of Foreign Investment Laws among Developing Countries: an Interpretation of
the Andean Group Experience, 16 J. COM. MKT. STUD. 22, 23 (1977).
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American nations on the developed countries and improve the
overall living conditions of the area. Integration processes evolved
as different groups of countries joined together to set regional
goals and to structure systems to achieve them."5
The first group to organize in Latin America to pursue the pro-
cess of industrial integration was the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA),5 whose members were committed to the
formation of a Latin American Common Market. 7 The theory
behind LAFTA was, in effect, import substitution on a regional
rather than a national scale. Member countries agreed to lower
their tariffs for products traded among themselves, hoping to
create an expanded market 8 that would benefit from economies of
scale and help maximize productivity. 9 A degree of market pro-
tection would be maintained by the erection of a common external
tariff placed on imports from outside the trade region. In theory,
this facilitates competition within the industries of the area,
thereby promoting efficiency. Also, adoption of organized regional
policies governing production eliminates unnecessary duplication
of effort. Such a union would stand on a better footing in negotia-
tions with developed countries because of the increased purchas-
ing power of the larger market."
The concept of integration is basically sound, as has been
demonstrated by the success of the EEC. But it is a less effective
method of improving overall development in the less developed
areas of the world and has been particularly difficult to apply in
Latin America.2' Major obstacles encountered there have been: (1)
the overall lack of physical integration among the countries; (2)
the inexperience of the governments, which results in inconsistent
policy formulation and supervision; and (3) the divergent levels of
economic development of the different countries.
First and fundamental among the problems has been the lack of
Other organizations that have been involved with integration efforts in Latin America
include: the Economic Commission for Latin America; the Central American Common
Market; The Carribean Free Trade Area, which later became the Carribean Common
Market; and the Latin American Economic System.
" Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free
Trade Association, signed Feb. 18, 1960, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMIS-
SION FOR LATIN AMERICA, I MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA 57
(1962).
,7 See UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, T.C. PUBLICATION 60 (1962).
An expanded market is best described as the area in which producers and consumers
interact freely in the purchase and sale of goods. DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 105.
1 Carl & Johnson, supra note 6, at 152.
o See generally Danino, The Andean Code after Five Years, 8 LAW. AMER. 635 (1976).
,1 See generally AXLINE, supra note 10.
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physical integration among the countries of Latin America. With
histories as colonies of the Iberian peninsula, these countries had
developed economies which concentrated almost exclusively on
the export of primary products to another continent, so that no
significant economic links were established among the neighbor-
ing Latin American countries. For example, although oceanic ship-
ping was well developed, other intra-regional communication and
transportation connections were virtually nonexistent after World
War II and still are inadequate for substantial trade or com-
munication. Compounding the problem in these sectors is the dif-
ficult terrain and the vast distances encountered in the interior of
South America; the continent covers a large geographic area, yet
over 90% of its population lives within 200 miles of the coast,
where all of the major cities are located.2 In the interior one finds
jungles and mountain ranges that make road, power line, and
telephone line construction difficult and costly.
The second problem has been the governments' inexperience in
both the international cooperation processes involved in integra-
tion and in the supervisory responsibilities attendent upon rapid
industrial development and trade expansion. These governments
developed for centuries in a state of regional isolation and the ex-
tent of their trade and production experience was limited to the
primary products sector. Their political processes had grown into
vastly different systems whose policies were difficult to har-
monize. Even within the nations it was difficult to organize the in-
frastructure necessary to ensure proper regulation and com-
pliance with rules involving different duty levels, quotas, places of
origin, etc., that are involved in a regional integration effort.
The third problem was the differing stages of national economic
development. A few countries had made some progress under the
import substitution policies and had industrial bases to build on
when the expanded market was created. Others had almost no in-
dustry. They found it difficult to attract foreign investment
because of the lack of skilled labor and the absence of capital need-
ed to purchase locally produced goods.23 These countries found
that they could not take advantage of the enlarged market
created by the Free Trade Area. Consequently, the dependency
that previously had rested on Western industrial countries was
transferred to the relatively more developed nations of the region,
2 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 8 (1980).
23 For a discussion of the effects of political and economic changes on the implementation
of the foreign investment rules, see Moxon, supra note 14, at 41.
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in LAFTA's case, Brazil and Argentina. The less developed coun-
tries again found themselves exploited by larger, more developed
nations, and were unable to industrialize competitively.,
An external problem also has impeded the integration process.
The foreign investment which had been sought so actively in the
import substitution phase of development was beginning to have
adverse effects in the area. Unconcerned with assisting the
development of the region, foreign investors viewed the newly ex-
panded markets solely as an opportunity to increase their sales
and profits in the area.25 To avoid the restrictions imposed on im-
ports to the area, they simply invested in controlled subsidiaries
within the region, thereby attaining the same access to the
markets as local firms." With no restrictions on their patents and
trademarks and with their much greater supply of capital, they
could compete easily with the less experienced local companies.
Such competition worked against a fundamental purpose of the
association, namely, the promotion of smaller local companies."
In order to alleviate some of these problems, five of the less
developed members of LAFTA joined together to form the An-
dean Pact. Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador were not
satisfied with the procedures set out by LAFTA and believed that
the benefits of the process were being distributed unequally to
the more developed nations. They gathered at Cartegena, Colom-
2 Id at 23. This has led to distrust by Latin American countries of a free market as an
equitable allocator of resources and productive activities, giving rise to an emphasis on
agreed assignments of various aspects of industries to certain countries through industrial
programming.
25 DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 72.
2' Vargas-Hildalgo, supra note 13, at 409.
' Other problems created by foreign investment include: (1) the lack of control of the na-
tional governments over the decisions of the multinationals that have a substantial impact
on the national economy; (2) the increase in dependency that results from the use of large
amounts of foreign technology; (3) the drain of national savings that are received by the
foreign enterprises in the form of short- and long-term loans; (4) the adverse effect on the
overall balance of payments as profits are repatriated to the home country of the company.
DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 73. Also, a great deal of the technology transferred was inap-
propriate to the region, as the foreign investors set up industries to make products for sale
in their home markets. The goods were not geared to the tastes and incomes of the local
people. AXLINE, supra note 10, at 20. That foreign investment is necessary to the develop-
ment process has never been doubted seriously. It simply requires proper regulation. This
is evidenced by the consideration in the Introduction to Decision 24 of the Andean Commis-
sion, citing the Declaration of Bogota, which recognized that foreign capital "may con-
tribute considerably to the economic development of Latin America, provided it encourages
capital formation in the country where it settles, facilitates broad participation of national
capital in this process and does not create any obstacles to regional integration." Andean
Commission: Decision Concerning Treatment of Foreign Capital, reprinted in 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 152 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Decision 24].
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
bia, on May 26, 1969, to sign the Agreement on Sub-Regional In-
tegration, known as the Cartagena Agreement. 8 Since LAFTA
previously had approved of the principles of subregional integra-
tion, the members of the Pact were able to remain members of
LAFTA. 9 The Cartagena Agreement provided that no actions
would be taken which would conflict with LAFTA policy, and the
Treaty was declared compatible with the Treaty-of Montivideo by
the Commission of the Executive Committee of LAFTA in July,
1969.30
III. PROVISIONS OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT
The Agreement outlines both its purposes and the methods by
which those purposes are to be achieved in a programmatic
fashion. It creates an institutional framework similar to that of the
EEC, with a Commission and a Board that perform much the same
functions as the European Council and Commission. 1 The Con-
sulting Committee and the Economic and Social Advisory Commit-
tee were established to assist and advise the Commission and the
Board. a2 These four institutions oversee the implementation of the
provisions of the Agreement and propose methods to better
facilitate economic integration.
Chapter II identifies the organs of the Pact and defines their
powers and jurisdictional limits.33 The Commission is the supreme
institution of the Pact and consists of five representatives, one
from each member country. It formulates the general policy of
the Pact and adopts measures necessary to accomplish its objec-
tives. 5 It elects the members of the Board, issues instructions to
it, and delegates to the Board what powers it deems necessary.36
In the words of the Agreement, the Commission "Promote[s] the
joint action of the sub-regional countries in connection with prob-
lems derived from international trade which may affect any one of
28 See note 2, supra.
The preamble to the Cartagena Agreement cites Resolutions 202 and 203 of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Latin American Free Trade Association as the
basis of the Agreement.
" Both groups desire to pursue integration, albeit in different programs, in their efforts
to unify and develop their economies.
" Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, at Arts. 145-55 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
32 Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 19-22.
Id. at Arts. 5-24.
" Id. at Art. 6.
" Id. at Art. 7.
38 Id. at Art. 7 (c)-(e).
[Vol. 10:2
them. . ." and "[shall] be acquainted with and solve all other mat-
ters of common interest. 7 The Commission acts through decisions
that are adopted with the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
representatives.38
The Board, or Junta, consists of three members, elected
unanimously by the Commission, who come from any of the na-
tions of Latin America. The Board members act independently of
any government, subject only to the "common interest" of the
Pact members. 9 Established as the technical organ of the Pact, it
has the responsibility of supervising the application of the Agree-
ment and the fulfillment of the decisions of the Commission. It car-
ries out studies for this purpose, both on its own initiative and at
the request of the Commission, and plays an active role in the
discussion of proposals in the meetings of the Commission." The
Board acts through proposals, which must be approved by the
unanimous vote of its members. These proposals are sent to the
Commission, where they are approved, disapproved, or amended.4'
Two advisory Committees were established so that the
business, labor and government groups could make their views
known to the decision makers of the Pact. The Economic and
Social Advisory Committee, composed of three business and three
labor delegates from each of the member countries, ordinarily
meets twice a year in Lima. It has no decision making authority,
but has the power to review the Board's proposals before they are
sent to the member countries for consideration. This committee
recently has spoken out on several programs, such as the plans for
IdL at Art. 8, 7 (k). Del Arco points out that this residual authority could play an impor-
tant role in certain situations. It is governed by the general voting system of the Agree-
ment, so that an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members would suffice to pass a deci-
sion under this clause, and would not be subject to a veto that might arise in other situa-
tions. DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 14.
' Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 6, 11. Article 11 sets out exceptions for
such important matters as: the common external tariff, the trade liberalization program,
and the approval of the list of goods to be reserved for the Sectoral Programs of Industrial
Development. These matters must be approved by a two-thirds affirmative vote, with no
negative vote. This protects members from being forced by a majority to take on more
obligations than they had bargained for. Some of the exceptions limit the members to one
veto, providing that on a second vote the previously negative vote will no longer be
counted, so that no member may obstruct any action indefinitely.
" Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 13, 14.
0 Id. at Arts. 13, 15.
"1 Id at Art. 17. The Board also plays a large role in maintaining relations with the
member governments, helping to convince them of the soundness of its proposals and the
effects of the proposals on the development of both the Pact and the individual member
states. It also must follow up on the fulfillment of the obligations of the Agreement by the
members. DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 15.
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sectoral programming and for the common external tariff. A study
is now under way to determine if this committee's voice has had a
positive impact on any decisions.42 The Consultative Committee,
with one representative from each of the member countries,
meets only when called by the Board or the Commission, unless a
member country requests that it consider a complaint or a special
problem. This committee maintains a close connection among the
member countries, advises and helps the Board in the fulfillment
of its duties and analyzes the proposals of the Board before they
are considered by the Commission. 3
That the institutions outlined in the Andean Pact were modeled
after those of the EEC is evidenced by their similarities. The An-
dean Commission, like the Council of the EEC, functions as the
legislative arm of the organization. Each member of these two
bodies represents a different member country in the
organization."' Both bodies are final decision makers, acting on the
proposals of the "executive" body of their respective group, the
Board in the case of the Pact and the Commission in the case of
the EEC. 5 Although in most cases they can act only on such pro-
posals, each is given the power to approve actions which it deems
necessary, but which have not been mandated specifically by the
Agreement or Treaty, when doing so is in the common interest."
The Andean Board and the European Commission, as executive
bodies, both represent the interests of their communities rather
than those of the individual member nations. 7 Both study and in-
itiate proposals that are presented to the legislative bodies for ap-
proval as decisions applicable to all members. 8 These proposals
may be amended by the legislative branch only by unanimous
vote, and if not approved may be sent back for modification."
These executive institutions act as the supervisors of the pro-
"2 Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art. 22. See BUSINESS INT'L CORP., OPERATING
IN LATIN AMERICA'S INTEGRATING MARKETS 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bus. INT'L].
"s Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 19-21. Bus. INT'L, supra note 42, at 27.
" See EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Arts. 49, 51, 54, 59, 63; Cartagena Agreement,
supra note 2, at Arts. 14(c), 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 38.
" Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Com-
munities, O.J. 1967, No. 152, 2, at Art. 2 [hereinafter cited as Merger Treaty].
" EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 235; Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art.
7(k).
" Merger Treaty, supra note 45, at Art. 10(2); Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at
Art. 14.
48 See note 45, supra.
" EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 149; Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art. 11
& Annex 1.
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cesses mandated by their juridical structures, undertaking the
studies necessary to make sure that the members comply with the
requirements set out by legislative organs."0 They both may enact
binding regulations in this regard, pursuant to their delegated or
inherent powers.' Finally, both the EEC and the Andean Pact
have provided for a committee with similar responsibilities for
aiding and advising the authoritative branches in the performance
of their duties.52
The major differences between the EEC and the Andean Pact
involve the binding nature of the institutional obligations and the
processes developed to settle disputes. In the Cartagena Agree-
ment, the members have committed themselves to obey those
rules and regulations which are negotiated.53 Each country, with
its own unique political system and level of development, must
enact laws aimed at achieving the same economic result. No in-
stitution was created by the Agreement to decide ultimately
whether the national laws are in harmony, as compared to the
EEC Treaty, which established the Court of Justice. Instead, the
Andean Commission was given the authority to supervise negotia-
tions among the members when differences arise concerning the
intent, effect, or fulfillment of obligations that the Commission has
produced." Thus, the Agreement is so dependent on voluntary
compliance and good faith negotiation that there are no provisions
for the imposition of sanctions, the removal of a member, or even
the withdrawal of benefits in a situation where a member is clearly
in violation of a provision and refuses to cooperate. This aspect of
the Andean process, while providing some needed flexibility, has
almost resulted in the breakdown of the Pact. It is hoped that the
Andean Court Treaty will fill the gaps in the Agreement that
have allowed this situation to exist. Before examining the treaty
creating the Andean court, it will be helpful to outline the pro-
grams by which the members of the Pact sought to integrate their
region. The inadequacy of the juridical structure created by the
Agreement to implement those programs will be illustrated by ex-
' EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 155; Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art.
15(d).
51 EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 155; Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art.
15(h).
, EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 193; Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at
Chapter I, Section C.
Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 32, 61.
Id. at Art. 23.
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amining the most significant problem to have developed in the
Pact's ten year history: the Chilean crisis.
A. Programs Outlined in the Agreement
The Agreement sets ambitious goals aimed at "balanced and
harmonious development [that] should convey equitable distribu-
tion of the benefits derived from the integration of the Member
Countries in order to reduce the differences existing between
them."55 It outlines specific programs, in Chapters III through IV,
which are to be developed and implemented through decisions of
the Commission, and which deal with the various problems that
had been encountered in LAFTA. These include: (1) formulation of
plans to harmonize the national laws of the member states in cer-
tain areas to facilitate cooperation;" (2) adoption of a plan whereby
various industries will be assigned to particular countries in an
equitable fashion that will better allow the processes to thrive in
the form of Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development; 7 (3)
development of a plan to reduce systematically all tariffs and
restrictions58 between the member countries, known as the Trade
Liberalization Program, while simultaneously establishing the
Common External Tariff between the group and the outside
world;59 (4) adoption of a system for the regulation of foreign in-
vestment which will best serve the needs of the region;0 (5) pro-
s Id. at Art. 2.
Id. at Chapter III. This chapter broadly outlines the purposes and structures of the
programs that are dealt with more specifically in the rest of the Agreement. Among the im-
portant areas of policy harmonization are: treatment of foreign capital, trademarks,
patents, licenses, and royalties; uniform regime of multinational enterprises; guidelines for
the harmonization of industrial development laws; harmonization of foreign exchange and
fiscal policies. DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 11.
" This is outlined in Chapter IV of the Agreement. One of the key elements for the suc-
cess of this program is the obligation of each member to respect the allocations received by
the others. This is done by restricting further development in those areas. DEL ARCO, supra
note 8, at 6.
' Trade restrictions include such non-tariff restrictions as: administrative restrictions,
including refusal or delay in granting of import licenses; tax restrictions in the form of addi-
tional charges, such as taxes on consumption, regional taxes, requirement of prior deposits;
laws that establish systems of preference for national purchases; differences in interpreta-
tion of common rules resulting in the paralysis of industry; and import quotas on
subregional products. DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 126.
" Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Chapters V, VI. The Liberalization program
favors only goods originating in the subregion. Payment of the Common External Tariff
does not enable a good to be traded freely throughout the area, as is the policy in a true
customs union. Origin determination in the Andean system is, therefore, an essential ele-
ment. DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 6.
' Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Chapter XII. Three reasons for the harmoniza-
tion of foreign investment laws can be stated: (1) to achieve better bargaining positions
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motion of the physical integration of the area;6 ' and (6) provision of
special treatment for the lesser developed countries of Bolivia and
Ecuador to reduce the existing differences among Pact members. 2
The major programs of this scheme that address the problems
of LAFTA are the Trade Liberalization Program (TLP), the Sec-
toral Programs for Industrial Development (SPID), and the plan
governing foreign investment in the area. It was believed that
these three programs, working harmoniously, would ensure the
achievement of a proper' distribution of the benefits of increased
development. The Trade Liberalization Program is similar to the
process developed by LAFTA. It provides for an automatic,
gradual elimination of duties, restrictions and charges on goods
that were produced in and imported from member countries,
while simultaneously establishing a common tariff applicable to all
goods imported from outside the Andean region.63 Irrevocable
deadlines were set for the attainment of the levels to be reached,
with special consideration given to Bolivia and Ecuador in respect
of their need for greater protection." In order to allow the coun-
tries to adapt to the process slowly, each was permitted to list a
specific number of products that it could exempt from the TLP for
a period of time.65 An escape clause provided that countries in
with foreign investors; (2) to avoid inequities in the integration process; (3) to help ac-
celerate the overall integration process. Harmonization is necessary to prevent the in-
vestors from playing the countries off against each other for their investment capital. This
will ensure the efficient allocation of resources and production activities, and ensure that
each member gets its fair share of foreign investment. Moxon, supra note 14, at 25, 34.
a Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Chapter X1.
Id. at Chapter XIII. One of the major concerns of the Pact was the prevention of the in-
equitable distribution of benefits that occurred in LAFTA. Thus, the Cartagena Agreement
made a specific policy providing special treatment which allowed a more accelerated rate of
growth for these lesser developed members. Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 13, at 402. This
preferential treatment is found in all areas of the Agreement, and distinguishes it from
most other integration mechanisms. See DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 13.
" Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 41, 61. The products are divided into four
categories: goods on the Common Schedule of LAFTA; goods reserved for the sectoral pro-
grams; goods not yet produced in the region; and remaining non-scheduled goods. There
were 175 items on the LAFTA Common List, which has not been expanded. Almost 2,000
goods have been reserved for the sectoral programs, amounting to about one-third of the
tariff schedule items. The bulk of the goods are in the non-scheduled, automatic category,
subject to the automatic reductions. Carl & Johnson, supra note 6, at 157.
" Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 45, 46, 50.
SId. at Art. 55. This is to allow the industries that are disadvantaged in competing with
the others in the subrogation to adapt to the new conditions or to terminate business with
the least impact on the national economy of a member. Goods excepted are not allowed to
benefit from the advantages of the Liberalization Program in the other countries and the
goods on the LAFTA Common List may not be excepted. DEL ARCO. supra note 8, at 169.
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emergency situations, such as severe imbalance of payments,
could find temporary relief from the program."
The Sectoral Program for Industrial Development had never
been attempted by any other integration organization. It was
established to better achieve an equitable distribution of in-
dustrial activities by assigning the different production processes
of an industry equally among all of the interested countries. For
example, under the Sectoral Program for the Automotive In-
dustry, enacted in September, 1977, each participating nation was
assigned a different class of vehicle to produce exclusively. The
vehicles were classified according to the number of cylinders and
weight. Within each category, a nation was required to elect a
basic model on which it would concentrate. Production of compo-
nent parts was governed by a similar process."
To prevent member countries from gaining any advantage
before the SPID's could be organized and allocated, the Commis-
sion, acting on a proposal of the Board, established a list of goods
that were reserved for these programs.6 The goods on the
reserve list were not subject to the Trade Liberalization Plan so
that producers in the region could not benefit from the automatic
reductions in import duties in their neighboring countries. 9 A
deadline was established for the approval of the SPID's, after
which time the goods on the list automatically reverted to the
Trade Liberalization Schedule."
In order to prevent the negative impacts caused by the
unorganized treatment of foreign capital and ownership rights,
Article 27 of the Agreement provides that the Commission, at the
proposal of the Board, should approve a "common regime for the
treatment of foreign capital, . . . patents, trademarks, and
royalties." Decision 24 was approved by the Commission and
entered into force on June 30, 1971."' It outlines an extensive set
Del Arco believes that the establishment of these lists was necessary to prevent problems
in the imbalance of the benefits and costs of the integration process, but that their size was
too large and the length of their duration too long, causing a delay in the establishment of
the expanded market that was so essential to the system. Id. at 109.
" Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art. 79.
"7 Bus. INT'L, supra note 42, at 69. Difficulties are encountered in the development of
these programs because they require great amounts of investment and quick development
of technology, as well as effective and homogenious application of the other provisions of
the Agreement, each of which has met with delays in implementation. Vargas-Hidalgo,
supra note 13, at 411.
Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art, 47.
" Id. at Art. 47.
70 Id. at Art. 53.
7, See note 27, supra.
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of regulations and restrictions designed to help the member coun-
tries control the effects that foreign companies could have on
their economic development. The major provisions of the Decision
stipulate: (1) that all foreign investment must be registered and
approved by the agency set up in each country to supervise the
regime;72 (2) that all new foreign investors and old foreign in-
vestors wishing to take advantage of the benefits of the Agree-
ment must divest themselves, through sales to local investors
over a period of fifteen years, of sufficient interest in their com-
panies to reduce their ownership and control to less than 50%, as
reflected in the administrative, technical and financial aspects of
management;73 (3) that the sale of local companies to foreign in-
vestors be approved only in special circumstances, such as their
imminent bankruptcy;74 (4) that access to local credit be limited to
short-term loans;75 (5) that limits be placed on the payment abroad
of profits, royalties, and technical fees;76 and (6) that regulations
dealing with contractual restrictions concerning trademarks, pa-
tent rights and transfer of technology be established.77
Many of the provisions of this controversial decision were con-
sidered harsh by foreign investors and required extensive
negotiations before receiving approval. 8 The restrictions did not
seek to deter foreign investment; rather, they were designed to
set out clearly the rights and obligations of foreign investors and
the guarantees that would protect them.79 The Andean Pact hoped
7 Id. at Arts. 2, 6. For an excellent analysis of the foreign investment code established
by Decision 24, see Danino, supra note 20. The decision was adopted in the first months of
the Pact's existence, with the hope of inducing foreign investors to direct their investments
toward development in accordance with the will of the governments. Vargas-Hidalgo,
supra note 13, at 404. The preamble to the decision reads,
integration must be fully at the service of Latin American enterprises by means
of a strong financial and technical support which will permit it to develop and effi-
ciently supply the regional market, and recognize that foreign private initiative
may play an important role to assure the achievement of the objectives of integra-
tion within the national policies of each of the countries of Latin America.
Decision 24, supra note 27.
73 DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 78.
" Decision 24, supra note 27, at Arts. 41, 43, 44.
75 DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 81.
" Decision 24, supra note 27, at Arts. 7, 16. These have not been significant yet because
most firms have not been productive enough to reach the limits. Moxon, supra note 14, at
48.
" DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 85.
7, Because of the changes which Decision 24 required in the members' national laws, one
writer predicted, correctly, that it would be quite difficult to implement. Moxon, supra note
14, at 37, 38.
"' DEL ARCO. supra note 8, at 72.
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that this would promote certainty and security, which would at-
tract new foreign investment while providing an efficient struc-
ture to measure and regulate its participation."0
One final aspect of the Agreement warrants emphasis because
of the important role it has played in the evolution of the Andean
regime. Throughout the Agreement, deadlines were set for the
establishment and implementation of the different programs."'
The imposition of deadlines is both necessary and dangerous in an
organizational effort of this type. 2 They are important because
they remove a great deal of discretion from the member govern-
ments, freeing them somewhat from the political pressures involved
in trade negotiations.83 This is particularly important in Latin
America, where the less stable governments must balance inter-
nal factors with external goals in seeking the best means of sur-
vival. However, deadlines also create a risk of non-fulfillment. If
the consequences of non-fulfillment are not specified clearly, the
passing of a deadline could lead to stagnation of the entire integra-
tion effort.8 ' With the Pact, the process is further complicated by
the fact that each decision is the product of a dual procedure: an
agreement on a program first must be reached unanimously by
the Board in the form of a proposal, which then must be sent to
the Commission for approval.8" In effect, this creates two
deadlines, the first of which is not stated explicitly. The Board
must pass its proposals to the Commission in time for the latter to
meet the specified deadline. Since it is impossible to determine
how long the Commission will take to approve the proposals (in-
deed, the Commission may decide to send a proposal back to the
Board), the imposition of deadlines is not very efficacious in the in-
tegration effort.
Since the formation of the Pact, the Commission has approved
over 100 decisions establishing the structure of the programs
outlined in the Agreement.8 Although the Board is concerned
80 Del Arco has concluded that, in spite of the predictions of the different members as to
the positive or negative impact of the Code, it has had no significant effect on the quantity
or nature of investments in the area. See Aho & del Arco, United States Direct Investment
in Latin America, 1966-77: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of the Andean Code (Deci-
sion 24), (Nov. 10, 1978) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic
Association in Washington, D.C., obtained from the Inter-American Development Bank).
" Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Arts. 27-30, 45-47, 49, 52.
82 DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 18.
Carl & Johnson, supra note 6, at 193.
DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 19.
' Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art. 33.
Among the decisions are: Decision 22, establishing procedures for harmonizing the
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with the application of the Agreement and the fulfillment of the
decisions of the Commission, it is given only the power to study
the members' compliance and report the results to the Commis-
sion. 7 To have legal effect within the member states, the decisions
must be transformed into national law, either by presidential
decree or by the proper legislative enactment. The fact that the
countries have unique political systems results in a flexibility of
implementation which impedes the harmonization of national
policies .88
The Board is charged with the promotion of this harmonization
through negotiations with the member governments. s9 However,
negotiations are difficult to conclude with the countries of Latin
America. 0 The governments are quite sensitive to the issue of
sovereignty and still follow the Calvo Doctrine. 1 The instability of
the political situations in these countries also makes it especially
difficult to promote those decisions that appear adverse to the
countries' short-term interests. In the ten years of the Pact's ex-
istence, the member countries have changed governments an
members' various policies; Decision 40, eliminating double taxation and multiple charging in
the region; Decision 45, establishing norms against unfair trade practices, dumping, and
price manipulation; Decision 46, dealing with the Andean multiple enterprise; and Decision
56, regulating highway traffic between the Andean Countries. The Latin American Times,
June, 1979, at 8, col. 1.
Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art. 15.
An agreement for new economic measures has no value if not accompanied by internal
implementation through appropriate laws and institutions, as well as by uniform interpreta-
tion of the rules. See generally 10 LAW. AMER. 414 (1978). As stated by Felipe Salazar, coor-
dinator of the Board in 1973, emphasizing the internal consolidation of the group as essen-
tial to putting the Agreement into practice,
only in this way will there begin to exist that string network of economic bonds
and specific interests whose existence will itself be the best guarantee of the sur-
vival of the system; only in this way will the Andean Group have its own life and
that impetus towards the future it needs.
DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 131.
" Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art. 15.
'0 This has been true particularly with Decision 24, as many of its terms are ambiguous
or undefined, leaving it open to different interpretations by the legislating bodies. Moxon,
supra note 14, at 39.
"1 The governments are suspicious of any outside influences, a reaction resulting from
their experience with outside intervention, both during the colonial days and afterward,
which was not always in their best interests. This gave rise to such political principles as
the Calvo Doctrine in the early 1900's, which requires everyone doing business in Latin
America to subject themselves to local law and to be restricted to the local courts for any
redress of grievances. Padilla, supra note 3, at 91. In most of the countries, the executive
branch of the government plays a major role in policy formation and dispute settlement,
overshadowing the other branches, especially the judiciary. The conservative inclinations
that prevail are impeding the reluctant governments from submitting to the jurisdiction of
a supraregional institution such as the Andean Court. Id. at 92.
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average of twice each.92 These new governments naturally are
more responsive to local opinion emphasizing national goals than
to the pressures created by the obligations of the Agreement.93
Added to the difficulty of the harmonization process is the com-
plexity of the total integration plan proposed by the Agreement,
which would require the simultaneous application of all of the dif-
ferent programs. 4 This multiplies the number of variables that
must be dealt with by the members, presenting a monumental
task for governments which have little experience in the areas of
industrialization and regulation. Countries making good faith ef-
forts to apply the rules often find it difficult to identify goods as
coming from within or outside of the region, and have substantial
problems recognizing, registering and regulating foreign in-
vestments.95 There also have been problems with the decisions
themselves, which often leave terms ambiguous or undefined. For
instance, the legality of payments, investments and means of
finance under Decision 24 depend on the interpretation of such
terms as "capital," "short-term credit" and "affiliate," but these
words are not defined in the decision. Repatriation of profits is
limited to 14%, but it is unclear whether that means gross or net,
before- or after-tax profits.96
The final failing of the Pact's system stems from the lack of
meaningful sanctions provided for enforcement. Even if the Board
and the Commission were able to conclude that a member was in
violation of the Agreement, the only punishment they could im-
pose would be to cease allowing the goods from that country to
'2 DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 130. These changes in governments have led to marked
changes in the economic policies of the countries, causing problems that have forced the
obligations of the integration process to take a lower priority at the national level. DEL
ARCO, supra note 8, at 134. The unique economic problems of the countries are transformed
into demands communicated through the political process to the governing body. These
demands must be satisfied to ensure political survival. Concessions demanded from the
members by the organization may cause severe strain on both sides. 10 LAw. AMER. 195,
196 (1978).
" In his evaluation, Vargas-Hidalgo identifies this problem as "politicization," where the
"national interest appears more immediate, actual, and urgent than the integration goal,
which is perceived as distant, uncertain, and less attractive from a domestic point of view."
Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 13, at 40.
I& at 41.
'5 While not all of the member countries have succeeded in establishing the agencies re-
quired to supervise the application of Decision 24, some have created more than one. This
has resulted in confusion and contradictory application of some of the rules, reducing the
overall effectiveness of the code and impeding the integration process. Danino, supra note
20, at 644.
N See Moxon, supra note 14, at 43.
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benefit from the expanded market created by the Trade
Liberalization Program and to remove the country from the in-
dustrial programming schemes. However, because of the Reserve
List and the exceptions lists granted to each country, which effec-
tively remove a country's goods from those benefits, and because
the Sectoral Programs have been delayed in their implementation,
these penalties have little impact." The countries are left with
persuasive efforts to bring the disobedient member in line, a
method of enforcement which has not been very effective.
Given this situation of substantially different governments
organized in a group that requires the application of rather flexi-
ble rules without enforcement authority, it is understandable why
progress in the integration process has been slow. From the
standpoint of an individual member country, then, the most ad-
vantageous short-term strategy is to apply the rules loosely to
itself while insisting on strict compliance from the others. 8 The
countries tend to support and emphasize those programs perceived
as favorable to their own situations, while enacting those con-
sidered disadvantageous in a diluted form that complies literally
with the group standards yet allows them some advantage over
other members. Alternatively, they can enact the law correctly
but limit its enforcement. Since all of the countries are involved to
some extent in this lack of compliance, none is anxious to complain
about the others' behavior. This has led to what has been described
as a "virtually legalized state of non-fulfillment of obligations.",",
B. The Chilean Crisis
Weaknesses in the Andean Pact's legal structure were major
factors contributing to the crisis that developed within the Pact in
1974 and resulted in the withdrawal of Chile in 1976. The crisis
began with a dispute over Decision 24 and climaxed when two of
the deadlines established in the Agreement expired and the
members could not agree on their extension.
97 DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 91.
" The national legislation may also contain loopholes that can be used by different
groups to their advantage. Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 13, at 415. Moxon calls this aspect of
the implementation process the "degree of tolerance," and suggests that it will be greater if
the national government, rather than a regional agency, is responsible for implementing the
Agreement. Moxon, supra note 14, at 31, 44, 52. Moxon's article, which deals primarily with
investment law harmonization, provides a good illustration of the forces that work against
the complete commitment by the member countries to the long-term objectives of the in-
tegration group.
" DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 16.
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The Cartagena Agreement was drafted by a committee of ex-
perts representing Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador
and Peru. Throughout the negotiations it was clear that there
were two divergent positions concerning the role to be played by
the liberalization and sectoral programming schemes. Chile and
Colombia advocated a commercialist concept, believing that the
market should play the key role in establishing the location of in-
dustries. They favored a universal, automatic and irrevocable
liberalization program applied to all goods so that only com-
petitive product lines would be maintained and expanded. Sec-
toral programming, in their view, was needed only in a few
dynamic sectors. 0
The other four countries supported a developmentalist thesis,
in which sectoral programming was considered the most impor-
tant mechanism of the integration process. They argued that the
problems which had hampered LAFTA were the result of its
liberalization procedure, which had led to the concentration of in-
dustry in the larger, more industrially advanced countries. The
idea of SPID's with an organized allocation of plants was
developed and refined during the negotiations.'0 '
As the Agreement shows, the developmentalists succeeded in
establishing industrial programming as the vital process of the in-
tegration scheme of the Andean Pact, but not without having to
make some compromises. To safeguard the interests of the com-
mercialists, the Agreement provides: (1) that the members
negotiate the list of products that are to be placed on the Reserve
List for Sectoral Programming, so that Chile and Colombia could
defend their positions; and (2) that these programs be approved by
the Commission before December 31, 1973, with the option to ex-
tend that deadline to December 31, 1975, if all of the goods on the
Reserve List had not been approved for a program. 2 The pro-
grams that are approved must contain provisions governing the
liberalization of the products included in them, while those pro-
ducts that fail to be approved for a program by the deadline must
automatically revert to the trade liberalization program."3
The reason for including the option to extend the deadline was
that the developmentalists feared that the commercialists would
stall the approval of the SPID's in order to have the reserved pro-
tOO Id. at 21.
101 Id. at 22.
'o Id at 23.
103 Id.
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ducts begin the process of liberalization. The commercialists,
however, did not want the reserve lists to be transformed de facto
into another exceptions list of products excluded from the
liberalization program. They advocated a short reserve period. To
reassure the developmentalists, provision was made for Commis-
sion approval of new SPID's at any time, even for products that
had already entered the liberalization process. Thus, the negotia-
tions established the pre-eminence of sectoral programming over
the automatic liberalization program, while assuring the commer-
cialists that their interests would be advanced.10 '
The crisis developed in two steps. The first involved Chile's
dissatisfaction with the regime created by Decision 24 and its ef-
forts to legislate around the decision's provisions. The second
resulted from the failure of the Commission to approve more than
two SPID's before the final deadline, due to the delays in their
negotiations caused by the dispute over Decision 24 and by the en-
try of Venezuela into the Pact on December 31, 1973.05
During the early 1970's, Salvador Allende and the Government
of the Popular Unity pursued policies that restricted foreign in-
vestment. They believed that Chile's economy could develop
without external aid. The government imposed high tariffs and
restrictions on imports and many industries were nationalized.'
This system proved to be unworkable and soon Allende began to
ease some of the restrictions. When Allende was overthrown in
1973, there were about 600 enterprises which had been nationalized
since the 1930's.0 7 General Pinochet, the new ruler, decided to pro-
ceed under the free-trade commercialist theory and sought to
remove these industries from the government's portfolio. He
returned all of those industries which had been nationalized to
their former owners and placed on sale the shares of those that
had been legitimately transferred. However, there was insuffi-
cient capital in Chile to purchase the state owned shares."8 Since
M0 Id. at 24.
0 The accession of Venezuela meant the addition of a market helpful to the achievement
of economies of scale that was the objective of industrial programming. It has one of the
most modern industrial bases in the Andean Group, with high productivity levels. Its
markets are more sophisitcated than the other member states, which presented problems
for the Pact members who needed to improve quality and efficiency to satisfy Venezuelan
demand. The accession also provided the need for renegotiated lists of exceptions in view of
the participation of the new member. DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 110.
' DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 87; Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 13, at 405.
'0 Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 13, at 406.
o DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 87.
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sales to foreign investors were limited by the provisions of Deci-
sion 24, the government found itself forced to maintain large
enterprises that it had neither the capital nor the sufficiently
trained personnel to operate. 1"9
Chile began negotiations with the other members in an effort to
find a solution to its problem, pressing for amendment to Decision
24. These efforts were completely unproductive. When no sym-
pathetic consideration from the other members was forthcoming,
Chile enacted Decree Law 600 on July 13, 1974, which provided
for treatment of foreign investment in a way that conflicted with
the provisions of Decision 24.1 This action caught the attention of
the other members, who perceived that Chile was using this law
to attract foreign investment, to their detriment and in violation
of the decision.11' The Commission responded in September, 1974,
with a declaration that Decree Law 600 was incompatible with the
letter and spirit of Decision 24 and charged the Board with the
responsibility of negotiating a solution to the controversy."2
The Board agreed to review Decision 24 and determined what
reforms were necessary to ensure its proper implementation.
Chile then enacted Decree Law 746 on November 9, 1974, which
expressly stated that Decision 24 was part of Chilean Law and
named the Foreign Investment Committee, created by Decree
Law 600, as the national agency responsible for its application." 3
In response to Chile's needs, the Andean Commission subsequently
approved Decision 97, which authorized Chile to sell government
owned enterprises to foreign investors. Further general amend-
ments to Decision 24 and to the Agreement were approved in 1976
in Decisions 103 and 109."'
During this period, the negotiations on the approval of the
SPID's naturally were quiescent. None of the members could
decide how to allocate industries so long as substantial uncertainty
persisted regarding the regulation of foreign investment. Chile
possibly could establish a more solid capital base than the other
countries, giving it an advantageous position in new industries.
The negotiations were delayed further during the period when
Id /d
", Id. at 88.
. Id. at 87, 88. This acts as a barrier to the Common Market because the other countries
would be less inclined to open their markets to a country that has strengthened its in-
dustrial base with extra investment capital. Moxon, supra note 14, at 50.
12 DEL ARCO, supra note 8, at 89; Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 13, at 405.
V3 argas-Hidalgo, supra note 13, at 406.
... Id. at 407.
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Venezuela acceded to the Pact, since it was obvious that the entry
of such a large and wealthy country would have a tremendous im-
pact on all aspects of the industrialization process."5
These factors led to the passage of the deadline of December 31,
1975, with only two programs having been approved: the Metal-
working Program and the Petrochemical Program."' Technically,
this meant that the member countries should immediately begin
reducing the duties and restrictions on the products on the
Reserve List, as required in the Agreement. However, the
developmentalists preferred to amend the Agreement to provide
a further extension. They argued that the sectoral programming
scheme should be maintained because it was the most important
aspect of the Agreement. But Chile had anticipated this action and
refused to approve any extension, and was perfectly within its
rights under the Agreement to do so. Chile argued that these pro-
longed extensions would harm the consumers and would cause
uncertainty in the business community. It also contended that the
extensions were an obstacle to the formation of the expanded
market, since most of the large industrial products were part of
the Reserve List, exempt from the Trade Liberalization
Program. "7
The Board began to study the situation to try to arrive at some
compromise. It produced a Draft Protocol to the Agreement,
which it presented to the Commission at its Sixteenth Special Ses-
sion on February 28, 1976.118 This document provided for an exten-
sion of all expired deadlines for another two years and revised the
method of approval of the SPID's so that only four members were
required to participate, thus preventing one member from being
able to defeat the approval process. This Draft Protocol was
discussed at length and was approved finally as Decision 100,
along with several other decisions responding to the needs of each
member."9
Decision 100, however, was only a proposal to amend the Agree-
ment under Article 7(j). Therefore, it was unanimously approved
as a "proposal to the Member Countries [of a modification] to th[e]
Agreement," and still had to be signed by each of the member
"' See note 105, supra.
Its DEL ARCO. supra note 8, at 25, 26.
... This reduced the members' incentive to abide by the agreement, since the only sanc-
tion available against them was their removal from this program. Moxon, supra note 14, at
43, 48.
its DEL ARCO. supra note 8, at 138.
... Id. at 145.
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states.'2 ° Chile still was not satisfied with some of the provisions.
When the Protocol was presented to the members for signature
on August 4, 1976, Chile refused to sign.12' Since the Priotocol re-
quired all of the members to sign for it to be effective as an
amendment, the Pact was at an impasse. The Agreement was vir-
tually amended, yet technically the members were obligated to
begin the liberalization of the products on the Reserve List.
Negotiations began again to find a solution to the problem. The
major difficulty preventing a quick solution was the fact that
there were no provisions for the removal or suspension of a
member, even where apparently no compromise could be reached.
Finally, on October 5, 1976, an Additional Protocol was signed
creating a Special Commission made up of the five developmen-
talist countries and Colombia (which had been satisfied with the
negotiated amendments to the Agreement) on one side, and Chile
on the other.'22 The Special Commission was charged with resolv-
ing the differences between the two sides, although it generally
was felt that no compromises would be offered by either. A
critical provision of the Protocol, however, provided that if no
agreement between the countries could be reached within twenty-
four days, Chile would withdraw from the Pact by renouncing all
of its rights and terminating all of its obligations. This was, in ef-
fect, a polite postponement of the inevitable. No agreement could
be reached and on October 29, 1976, Chile ceased to be a member
of the Cartagena Agreement.'23
The impasse was resolved and the survivors were unified by
their efforts to keep the Pact operating.'24 Soon after Chile's
withdrawal, several decisions were approved to eliminate some of
the divisive aspects of the Agreement that had precipitated the
crisis, but these amendments were not concerned with the struc-
ture of the Pact itself. Thus, the Agreement still left the Pact
open to problems caused by differences of interpretation and im-
plementation. The flaws in the dispute settlement mechanisms
provided by the Agreement have been described succinctly as
follows:
When a dispute arises between member states, certain steps
are to be taken towards the resolution of differences. The first
20 Cartagena Agreement, supra note 2, at Art. 7(j).
121 DEL ARCO. supra note 8, at 156.
122 Id. at 168.
23 Id. at 169.
'2 Id. at 162.
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step is direct negotiation between the parties to the dispute.
Where direct negotiation fails, the Commission may intervene
by exercising its good offices and taking other informal
measures. If these measures fail to resolve the parties' dif-
ferences, then the Commission must make formal efforts at con-
ciliation.
The procedure devised for conciliating legal disputes consists
of the appointment of an ad hoc committee by the Commission
composed of a national representing each disputant and a na-
tional from each of the remaining member countries. The Com-
mittee is charged with conducting its own investigation, hearing
the parties, and, by majority vote, adopting a report containing
recommendations for the resolution of the problem. The report
is then referred to the Commission for its final decision. Not-
withstanding these procedures, this method of dispute settle-
ment has proven totally inadequate since the decision of the
Commission is not binding.
Where these efforts do not resolve the dispute, the Agree-
ment provides that the member countries shall be subject to the
LAFTA Protocol on the Settlement of Disputes. While the
Agreement provides that members of the Andean Group shall
undertake steps to ratify the Protocol as soon as possible, only
Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador have ratified it to date. Thus, as
in the case of LAFTA, there is no formal method of litigating
disputes and obtaining authoritative judgments regarding the
application of Andean Pact law. 2
These inadequacies suggest an acute need for a supranational
court. Two important characteristics of such a court would be (1)
provision of a permanent legal function, particularly for key areas
of subregional law; and (2) provision of a uniform interpretation of
the legal regime, especially regarding treatment of foreign capital
under Decision 24.'2
IV. THE ANDEAN COURT TREATY
The new Treaty probably can solve some of the dispute settle-
ment problems associated with the Agreement. It expands the
juridical structure of the Agreement, providing that the decisions
of the Commission and the resolutions of the Board shall be bind-
ing on the member countries. It also establishes a court to oversee
the activities of the Pact's institutions, to ensure member state
't Padilla, supra note 3, at 83.
'n Id. at 84, quoting and translating Professor Orrego-Vienna, La Creacion de un
Tribunal de Justicia en el Grupo Andino, 8 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION 37 (1974).
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compliance with the supranational juridical structure, and to pro-
vide advisory opinions concerning what the norms of that struc-
ture entail. In creating a court with these functions, the Andean
Pact has moved closer to the organization of the European
Economic Communities.
Chapter I of the Treaty provides a new definition of the
juridical structure of the Agreement. Article 1 of that chapter
states: "The juridical structure of the Cartagena Agreement com-
prises the following: a) Cartagena Agreement, its Protocols and
Additional Instruments, b) this Treaty, c) Decisions of the Com-
mission, and d) Resolutions of the Junta [Board]." The Cartagena
Agreement, with its protocols and supplementary instruments,
was discussed in the preceding section. The decisions of the Com-
mission are obligatory for the member countries and become
directly applicable to them when published in the Official Gazette
of the Cartagena Agreement. 7 A decision may provide that it be
adopted as internal law by the member states through express
acts. 8 In this respect, a decision is similar to a directive of the
Council of the EEC, which is binding on the member states as to
result but leaves to the choice of national authorities the form of
implementation. 9 Resolutions of the Board are effective as pro-
vided in the regulations approved by Decision 9 of the Commis-
sion in 1970.130 Similar to Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, Article 5 of
the Andean Treaty states that the members are committed to
adopt any measures "necessary to assure the fulfillment of the
norms which comprise the juridical structure of the Cartegena
Agreement," and are "committed not to adopt or apply any
measure which may be contrary to such norms, or which may, in
any way, prejudice their application."'' Thus, Article 5 makes the
decisions of the Commission and the Proposals of the Board bind-
ing on the member countries.
Having strengthened the other institutions of the Pact, the
Treaty, in Chapter II, establishes the Court as "one of the princi-
12 Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 3.
12 1d
I2 EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 189.
, Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 4.
's' Art. 5 of the EEC Treaty provides:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or par-
ticular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of
the objectives of this Treaty.
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ple institutions of the Cartagena Agreement" and sets out its
basic structure and functions.132 The Court is charged with three
responsibilities in Chapter III: (1) hearing actions of nullification,
which ensure that actions of the Board and Commission remain
within their powers under the Agreement; 3 3 (2) hearing actions of
non-compliance, which involve procedures and sanctions designed
to ensure compliance by the member states with the obligations of
the Agreement; and (3) giving advisory opinions, which inter-
pret the norms of the Agreement to ensure their uniform applica-
tion in the member states.'35 These responsibilities cast the Court
in the vital role of maintaining the Andean Pact's fidelity to the
Cartagena Agreement.
Section 1 of Chapter III concerns the Court's power to nullify
any actions of the Commission or Board "adopted in violation of
the norms which comprise the juridical structure of the Cartagena
Agreement, including ultra vires acts." These actions, decisions or
resolutions may be challenged by the Commission, by the Board,
by member states, and by any natural or juridical person harmed
by the challenged actions.'36 Any nullification action must be
1" Article 6 of the Treaty establishes the Court and provides that it will sit in Quito,
Ecuador. It is to be "endowed with the organization and functions established in [the]
Treaty." It will be composed of five justices, nationals of the member countries, of high
moral reputation, who meet the standards required in their countries of origin for the
highest judicial functions. They are to be independent in the exercise of their functions and
may not perform any type of professional activities other than teaching, whether
remunerated or not. Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 7.
The judges will be selected by unanimous vote of plenipotentiary representatives of the
member countries for terms of six years and may be reelected once. Id. at Arts. 8, 9. The
Commission is to approve, at the proposal of the Board and within three months of the
ratification of the Treaty by its signatories, a statute governing the functions of the Court
and outlining the judicial procedures to which causes of action in the Court are to be sub-
ject. Id at Art. 14. A judge may be removed from the Court, upon complaint of a member
country, only if he "has committed a grievous fault stipulated in the statute of the Court,
and in accordance with the procedure established therein." Id at Art. 11. This is done by
unanimous vote of plenipotentiaries of the member states convened to hear the complaint.
Id. Otherwise, the number of judges may be modified by the Commission upon unanimous
proposal of the Court. Id. at Arts. 7, 14.
The Commission also, on unanimous proposal of the Court, must create the position of At-
torney General for the Court, with the number and functions of its office to be established
in the statute of the Court. Id. at Art. 7. The member countries are obligated to provide the
Court any facilities necessary for the performance of its functions and must grant the Court
and its justices the immunities recognized by international practice, with justices given the
rank of chief of a diplomatic mission. Id. at Art. 13. Finally, the Court, must propose its
budget each year to the Commission for approval. Id at Art. 16.
'u Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Chapter III, First Section.
Id at Chapter III, Second Section.
Id. at Chapter III, Third Section.
" Id at Art. 19. Member States may only challenge decisions approved without their af-
firmative vote. Id at Art. 18.
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presented to the Court within a year of the act's entry into force.137
The challenge of any act does not affect its applicability or en-
forceability until the Court rules that it partially or totally
nullified. 38 In either event, the Court must indicate what effect its
ruling is to have. The institution whose actions have been nullified
then must adopt the required measures.1
31
The Andean Court nullification provisions closely resemble
those of the European Court of Justice. Article 173 states that the
European Court "shall review the legality of acts of the Council
and the Commission .... ',140 Nullification actions may be brought
by a member state, the Council, or the Commission. Grounds for
the actions include lack of competence, infringement of an essen-
tial procedural requirement, infringement of the EEC Treaty or
any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.'
As with the Andean Court, any natural or legal person may bring
a nullification action. The European qualifications of this right are
that the decision challenged either must be directed toward the
complainant or, if "in the form of a regulation or a decision
directed to another person, [be] of direct and individual concern to
the former."'42 The European rules regarding natural or legal per-
sons differ only slightly from those of the Andean Court. The An-
dean Court Treaty requires that decisions of the Commission or
resolutions of the Junta be applicable to the complainants and that
the complainants be harmed by them.
One difference between the European and Andean nullification
procedures concerns the situation where an institution is called
upon to act but fails to do so. Article 175 of the EEC Treaty pro-
vides that, in such a situation, any of the parties entitled to bring
nullification actions may bring a second action. The EEC Treaty
specifically states that an institution whose act is declared void or
whose failure to act is declared contrary to the Treaty "shall be
required to take the necessary measures to comply with the
Court's judgment." Lacking this specific reference to suits
against institutions for failure to act, the Andean Court might ap-
pear to be without a crucial enforcement power. However, the An-
' Id. at Art. 20.
.3 Id. at Art. 21.
Id, at Art. 22.
", EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Arts. 169-171. The EEC Treaty does not prevent affir-
matively voting members from challenging actions as does the Andean Court Treaty.
' Id. at Art. 175.
Id M at Art. 173.
'Id at Art. 176.
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dean Court seems to have sufficient authority by virtue of its
general nullification provisions, which require that the institution
"whose act has been nullified must adopt the measures required
to assure the effective fulfillment of the decision of the Court."'"
Thus, upon an institution's failure to act, a complainant need only
bring a second nullification action, pleading for a specific com-
pliance order by the Court against the offending institution. This
difference between the two Treaties, then, probably will be minor
in practice. The absence of a specific provision on the part of the
Andean Treaty should not impair the effectiveness of that court.
The second responsibility of the Andean Court concerns actions
of noncompliance by member states. It, too, closely resembles the
provisions of the EEC Treaty. Both require that the respective
legislative organ, the Junta in the case of the Andean Pact and
the Commission in the case of the EEC, be the major participant
in any action against a member. Both may act on their own or
upon the presentation of a complaint by a member country.'45 The
legislative institution must present an opinion to the member
country whose actions are being challenged and allow it to re-
spond, subject to time limits set by the legislative body.' If no
suitable response is received, the institution may present the case
before the court. If the institution fails to act upon a member's
complaint within the time limit, the complaining member state
may bring the action directly to the court."7
When either court rules that a member has failed to fulfill an
obligation of the Treaty or Agreement, that state is required to
adopt the measures necessary for compliance with the decision of
the court."8 If it fails to do so, it may be subjected to sanctions im-
posed by the court. In the EEC, the Court is allowed to impose
penalties which have been approved by the Council in regulations.
The regulations, in some cases, may give the Court unlimited
discretion.'49 In contrast, the Andean Court must determine the
Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 22 (emphasis added).
Id. at Arts. 23, 24; EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Arts. 169, 170.
", Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Arts. 23, 24; EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at
Arts. 169, 170. This time limit varies according to the urgency of the matter, and cannot ex-
ceed two months in the case of the Pact or three months in the EEC. Andean Court Treaty,
supra note 1, at Art. 23; EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 170.
... Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 24; EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art.
170.
1" Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 25; EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art.
171.
", EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 172.
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limits "within which the complainant country, or any other coun-
try, may restrict or suspend, totally or partially, the advantages
deriving from the Agreement which benefit the noncomplying
member country."'" Thus, the Andean Court can resort only to in-
direct penalties to ensure proper implementation of the Agree-
ment by the member states, whereas the European Court, in some
cases, may impose direct penalties.
Two procedures are provided in the Andean Court Treaty
which are not found in the EEC. First, the Andean Court's rulings
which are issued in noncompliance actions may be reviewed upon
the petition of an interested party if the petition is based on facts,
unknown at the time of the original proceeding, which might have
influenced the outcome of the case. 1' Second, and more significant,
natural and juridical persons are given the right to bring causes of
action in their national courts when member countries fail to
adopt measures necessary to fulfill the norms of the Agreement,
provided that those persons are affected thereby.' No such right
of action is granted explicitly by the EEC Treaty, although there
has been debate whether that Treaty implicitly gives a private
right of action to nationals of member countries. 5 '
The extent to which the Andean Court Treaty provides an ef-
fective form of redress for member state noncompliance will de-
pend on the Court's ability to interpret the national laws of the
member states, an essential element for determining compliance.
The final section of Chapter III prescribes the Court's powers of
interpretation. The Court first is given the authority to interpret
the norms of the juridical structure of the Agreement with "prior
advisory opinions" which, it is presumed, will be published in the
Official Gazette.'54 This will provide more certainty to those who
are affected by the norms and will assist the uniform application
of the norms by the member countries. However, because the An-
150 Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 25.
IS! Id. at Art. 26.
, Id. at Art. 27. That article provides:
Natural and juridical persons shall have the right to bring causes of action in the
competent national courts, in accordance with the provisions of domestic law,
when the member countries do not comply with that provided in Article 5 of this
Treaty and the rights of such persons are affected by this noncompliance.
It is not clear yet whether the requirement that the actions be brought "in accordance with
the provisions of domestic law" will serve to limit the scope of the Treaty-based right to sue
for noncompliance.
1" For a discussion of the direct applicability of EEC law, see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1270-1280 (1976).
'4 Andean Court Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. 28.
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dean Court Treaty retains a measure of flexibility reminiscent of
the Cartagena Agreement, the Court's interpretative powers still
must accommodate the sovereignty of the member states. Resolu-
tion of the tension between sovereignty and uniform interpreta-
tion is attempted in the remainder of Chapter III, which deals
with the right of the Andean Court to interpret the norms of the
Agreement upon a petition from a judge of a national court.
Under Article 29, a national judge who is trying a case involv-
ing the norms of the Agreement may petition the Andean Court
for its interpretation of those norms, provided that the Court's
ruling is subject to appeal within that national system. If the rul-
ing is not appealable, "the judge shall suspend the proceeding and
petition the interpretation of the Court, ex officio in all cases, or
upon the petition of an interested party, if so required by law." '55
In either situation, the judge hearing the case must adopt the in-
terpretation of the Court.'6 Article 30 states that "the Court shall
restrict its interpretation to defining the content and scope of the
norms of the juridical structure of the Cartagena Agreement. The
Court may not interpret the content and scope of domestic law
nor judge the substantive facts of the case."
It appears that, by virtue of the rules for advisory opinions,
member state governments retain, to some extent, the power to
determine, ultimately the interpretation of norms of the Cartagena
Agreement. This seems to conflict somewhat with other parts of
the Treaty. Article 5 requires the member states to adopt all
necessary measures to fulfill the norms of the Agreement and not
to adopt those that conflict with them. Article 27 gives natural
and juridical persons the right to bring an action in national
courts when the members do not comply with Article 5 and the
persons are affected by the noncompliance. Such a procedure will
involve the norms of the Agreement and their interpretation.
However, the judges of the national courts may petition the An-
dean court for its interpretation only if the Court's ruling is ap-
pealable within their national system or upon petition by an in-
terested party, if required by national law. Furthermore, if na-
tional law requires the national court to make its ruling before the
Andean Court's interpretation is received, the national court
must proceed to decide the case.' 7 Since referral to the Court in
either case depends upon national law, it is up to the member
' Id at Art. 29.
ISO Id. at Art. 31.
,5, Id at Art. 29.
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state governments to provide this procedural right. Even if a
judge should petition the Court for its interpretation, the Court is
prohibited from assessing the content and scope of any domestic
laws that might be involved. It is limited to the interpretation of
the norms of the Agreement.'58 As a result, the only recourse for
the agrieved party would lie not in the form of an advisory opin-
ion, but rather in an action for noncompliance. The Court's power
to render advisory opinions has been limited to accommodate the
sovereignty of the member states. 59
The European Court of Justice is empowered to give what are
called "preliminary rulings" concerning EEC Treaty interpreta-
tion, the validity and interpretation of the acts of Community in-
stitutions, and the interpretation of the statutes of entities
established by and act of the Council.' Although this is a more
detailed enumeration of interpretative powers than is found in the
Andean Court Treaty, the two courts seem to have basically the
same function in this area. A noteworthy difference, however, is
the fact that the EEC Treaty takes a more direct approach to the
problem of accommodating member states' sovereignty. When a
question which is within the European Court's interpretative
powers is raised before a national court, that court "may, if it con-
siders that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to
give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon."'' In the EEC, the test for referral is two-fold: (1) it must
be a question within the Court of Justice's interpretive powers;
and (2) the national court must consider the question to be
necessary to enable it to give judgment.
The Andean Court Treaty provides national courts with less
discretion. Under that treaty, the national court can refer the
question only if: (1) the question concerns the norms of the Agree-
"' Id. at Art. 30.
... The final chapters of the Treaty contain various general provisions, including: (1) the
rulings of the Court do not have to be legislated in any of the member countries to be en-
forceable; (2) the member countries are limited to the Court for the resolution of any con-
troversies arising under the Agreement and cannot look to any other court, arbitration
system or other procedure not provided by the Treaty, such as those outlined in Article 23
of the Agreement; (3) the Board is given the responsibility of publishing the Official
Gazette, containing the Decisions of the Commission, the Resolutions of the Board, and the
decisions of the Court; and (4) a provision that the Treaty will enter into force when the
subscribing members have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary of
the Commission of the Pact and will remain in effect independently of the existence of
LAFTA, which is expected to dissolve at the end of 1980. Id. at Arts. 32-34, 37, 38.
60 EEC Treaty, supra note 31, at Art. 177.
.61 d.
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ment; (2) the Andean Court's ruling is appealable in the national
system; and (3) if the ruling is not appealable, referral can be made
at the court's descretion or upon petition if required by law. By
imposing the conditions relating to appealability and legal
authorization to refer questions, the Andean Treaty has made the
Court's relation to national courts more complex and perhaps
more tenuous.
The Andean Court offers much hope for resolving some of the
enforcement problems which have hampered progress in the An-
dean Pact. Endowed with the power to nullify acts by Pact institu-
tions which conflict with Cartagena Agreement, the power to com-
pel member states to comply with the norms of the Pact, and the
power to render advisory opinions concerning those norms, the
Andean Court can consolidate regional integration efforts. It
closely resembles the European Court of Justice. Two important
points of difference are that the Andean Court can hear non-
compliance actions brought by natural or legal persons, and that
the Andean Court has more limitations placed upon its power to
give advisory opinions. In fact, the striking similarities between
the courts raises the question whether a facsimile of the European
Court can function effectively in a regional integration scheme
where the economies and development levels of the member
states are substantially different from those of EEC countries.
V. CONCLUSION
The Andean Court Treaty promises to advance integration in
the Andean system considerably, having filled many of the gaps
left by the original Agreement. But the success of the Pact will de-
pend on the willingness of its members to submit to a program
that shows promise for the long term while seeming somewhat
harmful for the individual members in the short term. With deter-
mination and flexibility the Andean Pact has survived for a
decade. It not only reflects a significant effort by Latin American
countries to improve their economic position in the world, it
represents an example after which others groups seeking the same
goals can model themselves. Accordingly, the role of a central
court in this regional integration scheme can be expected to
receive much attention.
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